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REPRESENTING RACE OUTSIDE OF 
EXPLICITLY RACIALIZED CONTEXTS 
Naomi R. Cahn* 
OORODUCTION 
Welfare "as we know it" ended in 1996,1 a victim of a conserva­
tism that views welfare recipients as lazy and immoral. One aspect 
of welfare that is, however, unlikely to experience radical change is 
child support.2 More vigorous child support enforcement has be­
come an increasingly important component of federal welfare re­
form bills over the past two decades because of the twin hopes of 
fiscal and parental responsibility: first, that child support will reim­
burse welfare costs, and second, that fathers will take more respon­
sibility for their children.3 
Child support programs within the welfare system perpetuate a 
negative perception of poor people. Many individuals assume that 
poor men and women are uncooperative - that women would 
rather stay home on the government dole than collect child support 
or find work, and that men have left their homes and are unwilling 
to support their children. These images of poor people are not just 
class based; they also rely on stereotypes of gendered and raced 
behavior. 
Th.is essay argues that we must challenge the gendered and 
raced images in welfare reform cases by making explicit the stereo­
types that inform public welfare regulations. Even though such ad­
vocacy may not change the actual outcomes of the cases, it can 
begin to change the rhetoric, raising public awareness of the effect 
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. A.B. 1979, 
Princeton; J.D. 1983, Columbia; LL.M 1989, Georgetown. - Ed. Thanks to Tony Alfieri, 
Paul Butler, Tony Gambino, Peter Margulies, Dorothy Roberts, and Margaret Russell for 
their comments on this project, to Jennifer Kleeman and Michelle Wu for research assistance, 
and to GW Law School for a summer research grant. 
1. President Bill Clinton made this promise to the American people. See Jason DeParle, 
The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Journey, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at Al. 
2. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Title III, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. Indeed, the legislation did not change existing 
child support programs, and it extended child support cooperation requirements to food 
stamp recipients. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, Title III, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 822, 110 Stat. 2321-22. As the states are struggling to 
implement other aspects of the Act, it is highly unlikely that they will do anything but 
strengthen the child support requirements. 
3. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
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of such programs. Ultimately, advocates can take apart the raced 
and gendered spaces in which poor people live, allowing them both 
to stay at home and to leave the home. Representation in welfare 
reform litigation, then, allows advocates to point out the racialized 
aspects of their cases. It shows the relevance of race to litigation 
claims and the litigation process. 
As an introductory matter, I want to connect my essay with 
others in this Symposium. Unlike many other participants, I am 
examining an issue that is not explicitly race based. There are white 
and black recipients of welfare; this article is not about violence 
between the races, or about competition for jobs between the races, 
or even about litigation between parties who belong to different 
racial groups. Although welfare reform is not an explicitly raced 
issue, I want to use it to show the implicitly raced nature of various 
forms of representation. The goal of this essay, then, is not just to 
discuss substantive welfare reform; I also would like to examine 
critically the role of race as it appears throughout the representa­
tion process. 
How, then, is representing welfare recipients "raced"?4 There 
are several different levels of response that intenveave substantive 
law and lawyering concerns. First, notwithstanding the numbers, 
the public perception of welfare is raced black.5 Thus, regardless of 
the actual impact of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
("AFDC") regulations, their implementation is perceived as affect­
ing blacks, even though this perception does not reflect reality. In­
deed, welfare reform can be seen as an attempt to control poor 
black women.6 Thus, although welfare is not explicitly raced, it is 
implicitly a raced issue. 
4. Professor Jerome Culp identifies "the race question [as] . . .  'How does race alter the 
contours of legal reality?' " Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 
1991 Civil Rights Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 
966 (1993) (emphasis omitted). For feminists, this issue is phrased as asking "the woman 
question. " See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990). 
For a discussion of the dangers of analogizing race and sex discrimination, see Trina Grillo & 
Stephanie M. Wtldman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Com­
parisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397. 
5. See RUIH SIDEL, KEEPING WOMEN AND CmIDREN LAST. AMERICA'S WAR ON nm 
PooR 29 (1996) ("Even if one asks a sociology class, most of whom are themselves members 
of minority groups, 'From what racial background are most AFDC recipients?' the answer 
invariably is that most of them are African-American."); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites 
and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1159 (1995); Lisa A. Crooms, An "Age of [Im]possibility": Rhetoric, Welfare Re­
form, and Poverty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1953, 1971-72 (1996) (book review) (suggesting that 
being black has become "a proxy for poverty, " thus helping to explain myths about welfare 
recipients and dependency). 
6. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 871, 873 
(1994); Williams, supra note 5; see infra text accompanying notes 37-55. Professor 1\vila 
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Second, African Americans are disproportionately recipients of 
welfare; they are disproportionately poor, and disproportionately in 
single-parent households.7 Thus, even though blacks do not consti­
tute the majority of public welfare8 recipients, welfare has a dispro­
portionate effect on the African-American community.9 It follows, 
then, that African Americans will constitute a significant number of 
legal-services clients, and that welfare reform will have a significant 
impact on them. 
Third, the legal system is overwhelmingly white. Over 85% of 
the legal profession is white; only 3.3 % is African American.10 The 
legal services lawyers who do much of the welfare representation 
are white; given the race of low-income people, there will be inter­
race (as well as intrarace) representation.11 In addition, judges are 
overwhelmingly 
. 
white, meaning that a black plaintiff will, most 
Perry suggests that the contemporary obsession with blacks on welfare exists because "many 
of the consequences of poverty often associated with single mother families can no longer be 
internalized within the black community." 1\vila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism, 
and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 353 (1996). 
7. Approximately 25% of black mothers of childbearing age, and 7% of corresponding 
white mothers, are AFDC recipients. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 
MOTHERS WHO RECEIVE AFDC PAYMENIS (1996), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fed­
doc File. 
8. As I was writing this article, Congress enacted legislation that abolished AFDC and 
replaced the federal program with block grants to states. See The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Title III, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 
2105. The cases that I discuss, and the statistical compilations that I use, are based on the 
AFDC program. Although the AFDC program no longer exists, the child support coopera­
tion requirements that I discuss in this essay remain similar under the new legislation. 
9. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility Act: Hearings on H.R. 4 Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Resources of the House Ways and Means Comm., 104th Cong. (1995), available in 
LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST File (statement of Katherine McFate, policy analyst) (dis­
cussing the Contract with America's impact on African Americans). David Ellwood and 
Mary Jo Bane note that race does not predict welfare dependence, but that "African-Ameri­
can AFDC recipients are more likely than white recipients to have low levels of education, to 
be single, and to have large families - all factors that are positively associated with welfare 
dependence." David T. Ellwood & Mary Jo Bane, Understanding Welfare Dynamics, in WEL­
FARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 28, 45 (David T. Ellwood & Mary Jo Bane 
eds., 1994). 
10. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISrICAL AB�CT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1995, at 411 tbl. 649 (115th ed. 1995) (providing 1994 statistics); Robert L. 
Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing Legal Pro­
fession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 345, 378 (1994) (reporting that 5.1 % 
of American law students in 1990 were African American). In 1993, there were 22,820 black 
lawyers and judges. ,See Blacks in the Legal Profession, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 1995, at lA. 
11. Five and one-half percent of all African American students take public interest jobs. 
See Nelson, supra note 10, at 378; see also Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: 
Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1807, 1808 
(1993) (noting that when she takes her first-year criminal law class to the local court to watch 
criminal cases, the defendants are never white, while the judges, prosecutors, and defense 
attorneys are always white). 
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likely, face a white judge. And, as studies of race discrimination in 
the courts show, racial biases infect the-American judicial process.12 
Fourth, all representation can be raced.13 Each of us has a race, 
even though whites tend to think that everyone except them has a 
race, 14 or else they find it difficult to confront the role that race 
plays in their own lives, a role that is very different from the role 
that race plays in the lives of people of color.15 Thus, the mere fact 
of representation implicates race, regardless of the race of the client 
or the actors in the legal system. Race will inevitably affect how the 
representation is conducted.16 The interaction between the lawyer 
and the client, and the decision whether to make race an explicit 
issue in a complaint, are "infected" by race consciousness.17 
Finally, welfare reform lawyering shows how race might appear 
in lawyering, when the actual legal problem is not explicitly about 
race. Although the legal issues in welfare reform do not appear to 
involve particularly racialized issues because there is no interracial 
conflict - unlike, for example, with affirmative action - the "race 
question" still needs to be asked. How then should race be repre­
sented in this lawyering? Is it appropriate not to mention race? 
12. See generally Todd D. Peterson, Studying the Impact of Race and Ethnicity in the 
Federal Courts, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 173 {1996); Report of the Special Committee on Race 
and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 189 {1996); Suellyn Scamecchia, State Responses to Task Force Reports on 
Race and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 923 (1993); Angela Davis, Benign 
Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1660, 1686 n.100 {1996) 
{book review) (noting that eleven states and the District of Columbia have published reports 
on racial bias in the legal system). 
13. For a discussion of what I mean by "raced, " see D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made 
Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEo. L.J. 437, 440 (1993). 
14. See Rura FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATI'ERS: THE SocIAL CON· 
sraucnoN OF WHITENESS 137 (1993); ELIZABETH v. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 104-
07 (1988); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969-70 (1993); Martha R. Maho­
ney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 221 (1993). For discussions of race in legal representation, see 
Clark Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnogra­
phy of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298, 1370-83 (1992); Binny Miller, Give Them 
Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 {1994); 
Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Strait· 
jacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REv. 766 (1997); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetor­
ical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REv. 1 
{1990). 
15. See Grillo & Wildman, supra note 4; Russell, supra note 14. 
16. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnic­
ity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 1807, 1809 (1993). 
17. For further discussion of what I mean by "race consciousness, " see infra notes 130-35 
and accompanying text. I am aware that, in this essay, I am using race consciousness primar­
ily to refer to the impact of welfare on African Americans. 
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When advocates describe their clients, or when judges write opin­
ions, where is race?18 It is this issue - the tension between making 
race explicit, and not mentioning it at all - that is at the core of 
this article. It could be that discussing race, even when it, for exam­
ple, invokes existing stereotypes of blacks, will be beneficial to 
black plaintiffs, and therefore justifiable;19 or it may be that the ste­
reotypes are too destructive.20 Thinking about race in the context 
of welfare lawyering may focus too much attention on the negative 
images of black recipients. On the other hand, and especially in 
light of all of the reasons that this representation process is "raced," 
why not make it explicit? Yet, given that legal issues in welfare 
reform affect all races, does race really matter? 
In thinking about how to represent race in welfare lawyering, I 
hope to draw some lessons more generally for litigation in which 
race issues otherwise might not seem visible. My goal is to explore 
the implications of an ethic of race consciousness in a variety of 
different contexts. This essay is, then, concerned with representing 
race on two different, albeit intertwined, levels: the first is law re­
form, and the second is lawyering reform. Part I briefly discusses 
the relationship between child support and public welfare, and then 
focuses on the requirement that welfare recipients cooperate in es­
tablishing child support. Part I first shows how the cooperation 
requirement itself represents various negative images of black men 
and women, and then explores how courts have addressed these 
images when confronting legal challenges to the cooperation 
18. This is not an effort to criticize legal services lawyers. Having been a legal services 
lawyer, I know the difficulties presented by political realities and heavy caseloads. Cf. Alan 
W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor -A Commentary, 83 GEO. LJ. 
1669, 1699 (1995). Instead, I am exploring strategies that have been used in individual and 
class representation, as well as in legislative advocacy efforts, and am offering tentative sug­
gestions. Indeed, lawyers involved in the first welfare reform case to reach the Supreme 
Court repeatedly raised a race discrimination claim. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968}; 
infra note 36. 
19. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the 
Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 788, 789-90 (1996). 
20. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1995); 
see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 Tur.. L. REv. 1739 (1993) 
(discussing the importance of protections against racial stereotypes for defendants, victims, 
and witnesses in criminal cases). For a comparable discussion of the destructive stereotypes 
of battered women who kill, see Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The 
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1398 (1992); 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the 
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 195 (1986). The use of 
such images in criminal cases affects the ultimate outcome. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Im­
agery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law: The Relationship Between Images of Criminal 
Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in Southern Antebellum and Modern Appellate 
Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1165 (1995). 
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requirement. By rereading these decisions Part I demonstrates how 
race and gender are absent and appear not to affect the litigation 
process. Part II examines gender theory and shows the gendered 
nature of these different representations of black men and women. 
Finally, Part III suggests methods for challenging the legislative and 
judicial representations of black men and women portrayed 
through the cooperation requirement, and discusses reasons to con­
sider making representation raced. 
I. CHILD SUPPORT: AT-HOME WoMEN21 AND ABSENT MEN 
In contemporary culture, public welfare,22 race, and gender are 
integrally connected. While· it is true that, proportionately, there 
are more African American recipients of welfare than white recipi­
ents, and proportionately, there are more blacks living in poverty 
than whites, the majority of AFDC recipients nevertheless are not 
black.23 Yet the media routinely depict welfare recipients as 
African-American women, and, correspondingly, as lazy and im­
moral.24 Race has also affected the distribution of welfare benefits 
- the history of AFDC shows repeated attempts to exclude Afri­
can Americans through morality requirements.25 
21. Cf. HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY (Barbara Smith ed., 1983). 
"Home Girls" is a positive term that Smith chose as a way of depicting a black feminist 
community. 
22. This section focuses on AFDC recipients. As feminists have noted, "public welfare" 
takes many different forms and covers not just poor people, but also private corporations and 
upper-income families who receive various forms of federal subsidies and tax breaks. See 
MARlHA ALBER'ISON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIElH CENnJRy TRAGEDIES 163, 191 (1995); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of 
State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985); Martha Matthews, Baby 
Savers and Family Fixers: Some Reflections on Child Welfare Reform 43 (Oct. 19, 1995) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 
5 (1988) (pointing out that Americans do not consider the money received by the elderly and 
the disabled to be "welfare"); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NoT ENTITLED: SINGLE 
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 2-3, 5-6 (1994) (discussing the de­
velopment of negative connotations for "welfare" programs, in contrast to the neutral, or 
even positive connotations attached to social insurance programs); Dorothy E. Roberts, Wel­
fare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1577 & n.89 (1996) [hereinaf­
ter Roberts, Black Citizenship]. 
23. See Teresa L. Amott, Black Women and AFDC: Making Entitlement out of Necessity, 
in WoMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 280, 281 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990) [hereinafter 
WOMEN AND WELFARE]; Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial 
Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 457, n.133 (1996). 
24. See Williams, supra note 5, at 1163; see also Beverly Horsburgh, SchrlMinger's Cat, 
Eugenics, and the Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New 
Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of 
Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 531, 535 (1996) ("The stereotype of the lazy Black welfare 
queen of low intelligence, who breeds children in order to avoid working, dominates the 
public discussion on the federal budget. "). 
25. See GORDON, supra note 22, at 48 (discussing the lack of mothers' aid benefits re­
ceived by minorities); Williams, supra note 5, at 1176; Alexia Pappas, Note, Welfare Reform: 
February 1997] Welfare 971 
AFDC recipients are also gendered: they are mothers,26 and 
they are unmarried. Statistics show that single mothers comprise 
ninety-five percent of the adults on AFDC.27 Historically, how­
ever, all unmarried women and African American women were 
generally excluded from welfare because of their failure to comply 
with morality requirements.2s 
Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC") was part of the Social Se­
curity Act of 1935, although its roots reach far earlier. Attempts to 
provide support for the children of morally worthy widows first re­
ceived national attention at a 1909 White House Conference on 
Children.29 Illinois enacted a Mother's Aid Law in 1911, which pro­
vided money to women so that they could mother their own chil­
dren; the law limited eligibility to widows who were American 
citizens.30 Thirty-eight states had enacted similar legislation by 
1919.31 The actual benefits received from these programs were 
highly variable - not only did a large percentage of potentially 
eligible mothers not receive aid, but the amount received was gen­
erally insufficient to allow women to stay home as full-time 
mothers.32 Moreover, in light of the morality standards written into 
such laws, large categories of women could not receive aid. Only 
three of the laws allowed unmarried mothers to receive pensions,33 
and, in a 1931 study, the U.S. Children's Bureau found that ninety-
Child Welfare or the Rhetoric of Responsibility?, 45 DuKE LJ. 1301, 1307 (1996) ("A state 
could 'impose such • • .  eligibility requirements - as to means, moral character, etc. - as it 
[saw] fit.'" (alterations in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 74-628, at 36 (1935))). 
26. See David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of 
Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REv. 2575, 2575 (1995) ("AFDC is a program for 
children and their mothers.''). 
27. Bonna de la Cruz, Welfare Plan Gains More Favor; But Critics Wait for Funding De­
tails, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 21, 1996, at lA, available in LEXIS, News Library, Tennes File. 
28. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
29. See Barbara J. Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen's 
Compensation and Mother's Aid, in WOMEN AND WELFARE, supra note 23, at 123, 138. 
30. See id. at 139; see also Gwendolyn Mink, The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race, and 
the Origins of the American Welfare State, in WOMEN AND WELFARE, supra note 23, at 92, 
110. See generally MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING TI-IE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WEL­
FARE POLICY FROM CoLONJAL TlMEs TO TI-IE PRESENT 181-213 (1989) (discussing the history 
and adoption of pension laws for mothers); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND 
MOTI-IERS: THE POI.ITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN TI-IE UNITED STATES 424-79 
(1992) (same). A 1911 Missouri law allowed a pension to a widow who was "'in the judge­
ment of the Juvenile Court • • •  a proper person, morally, physically, and mentally, for the 
bringing up of her children.'" SKoCPOL, supra, at 428 (alteration in original) (quoting Roy 
LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, 1900-1935, at 100 (University of Pittsburgh 
Press 1986) (1968) ). 
31. See SKOCPOL, supra note 30, at 446-47 (providing a chart with the dates of state enact­
ments); Nelson, supra note 29, at 139. 
32. See SKOCPOL, supra note 30, at 471. 
33. See SKOCPOL, supra note 30, at 467. 
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six percent of the recipients were white, and only three percent 
were black.34 After the enactment of ADC, blacks continued to be 
excluded through morality requirements;3s "man-in-the-house" 
rules36 simultaneously discouraged the formation of two-parent 
families while policing the behavior of single women. 
The history of aid to poor women is thus replete with attempts 
to control their lives by conditioning public welfare on their compli­
ance with morality requirements.37 The purpose of the morality re­
quirements has, to some extent, changed: the original purpose of 
these requirements was to support worthy women, while the con­
temporary purpose is to stigmatize recipients.3s 
34. See Nelson, supra note 29, at 139. 
35. See generally GORDON, supra note 22; Roberts, Black Citizenship, supra note 22. 
36. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (striking down man-in-the-house rules). The 
Alabama regulation at issue in King is a dramatic illustration of the impact of the man-in-the­
house rules. Under federal law, "dependent children" with an absent parent were eligible for 
AFDC; Alabama denied aid to children who had a "substitute father." See King, 392 U.S. at 
313. A substitute father was a man who "'visits [the home] frequently for the purpose of 
cohabiting with the child's natural or adoptive mother.' " King, 392 U.S. at 314 (alteration in 
original). The meaning of "frequently" varied, depending on the caseworker; a woman might 
be "allowed" to cohabit once or twice a month, although, for at least one worker, cohabita­
tion every six months with the same man meant that he was acting as a "substitute father." 
See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGIITS MOVEMENT, 
1960-1973, at 62-68 (1993) (discussing the litigation strategy in King); MARTIN GARBUS, 
READY FOR THE DEFENSE 164 (1971). Although the state claimed that the regulation was 
not an attempt to regulate sexual conduct, the pretrial testimony appeared to indicate other­
wise. See King, 392 U.S. at 336 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The standard is the so-called 
immorality of the mother."); GARnus, supra, at 157. The Commissioner responsible for 
drafting the regulation stated that the woman could decide " 'to give up her pleasure or to act 
like a woman ought to act and continue to receive aid.' " GARBus, supra, at 157-58. More­
over, it did not matter to Alabama if the man was not the father, nor if he was legally respon­
sible for any of the children. See King, 392 U.S. at 314. The "substitute father" regulation, 
then, effectively prevented women from cohabitating. If they married the man, instead of 
cohabitating, then they were denied aid. See King, 392 U.S. at 318 n.13 (noting that, pursuant 
to federal legislation, although dependent children with two parents in the house could be 
eligible for aid, so long as a parent was unemployed, the majority of states, including Ala­
bama, had chosen not to extend eligibility to such families). 
The effect of the King regulation was also, not coincidentally, to deny aid to blacks. In 
the initial complaint, Martin Garbus, the attorney representing Ms. Smith, claimed that the 
regulation was racially discriminatory. See GARBUS, supra, at 155. He candidly admitted, in 
a subsequent book, that he had few facts in support of this claim at the time of filing. See id. 
Nonetheless, he found that although two-thirds of the AFDC recipients were black, virtually 
all of the families terminated from aid as a result of the substitute-father rule were black, and 
that the state's purpose in developing these regulations was to exclude blacks. See id. at 159-
61. The Supreme Court, however, struck down the regulation without reaching the issue of 
race discrimination. See King, 392 U.S. at 313. For further discussion of courts' attempts to 
avoid deciding race issues in welfare cases, see infra section I.C.2. 
37. This was true regardless of the type of "aid" these mothers received. See LINDA 
GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES 280-85 (1988) (discussing attempts to impose mid­
dle-class norms on poor women who were victims of domestic abuse). 
38. See Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REV. 
879, 880-81 (1994). 
Fe6ruary 1997] Welfare 973 
A. The Cooperation Requirement 
To receive public welfare, a custodial parent must relinquish 
her39 rights to receive child support, and assign all such rights to the 
state.40 Generally, at her initial interview with a caseworker, the 
potential recipient signs a simple form in which she agrees that the 
state is entitled to collect her child support. The custodial parent 
must also agree to cooperate with the local child support agency by 
helping to establish the identity of the father and obtain child sup­
port payments.41 Federal regulations require states to define "co­
operation" to include providing information during an interview 
with the local child support office, and even testifying at child sup­
port hearings, although the recipient may be excused from provid­
ing information if she attests, under penalty of perjury, to her 
inability to do so.42 The only other excuse for noncooperation is 
the existence of "good cause,"43 and the recipient bears the burden 
of proof.44 As a sanction for noncooperation, the mother becomes 
ineligible to receive bene:fits,45 and, in some states, the grant to the 
entire family may be terminated.46 
Although federal regulations on the cooperation requirement 
provide some uniformity, states have adopted various additional re­
quirements when defining the requirement's parameters. In several 
states, for example, the state not only requires that mothers provide 
the names and social security numbers of the fathers, but mandates 
that their benefits be withheld if they fail to do so, regardless of 
39. Virtually all of the custodial parents on AFDC are women. 
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1994). This section was unchanged by The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
41. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(a) (1995). 
42. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(b) (1995). 
43. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(a) (1995); see also Lisa Kelly, If Anybody Asks You Who I Am: 
An Outsider's Story of the Duty to Establish Paternity, 3 A¥. U. J. GENDER & L. 247 (1995) 
(offering a fictionalized, "but true," account of how the cooperation requirement affected 
one woman). 
44. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.40(c) (1995). The applicant has20 days from the date of making a 
good cause claim to provide sufficient corroborating evidence. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.43(b) 
(1995). 
45. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(d) (1995). While the child may still be able to receive AFDC 
money through an alternative mechanism, the amount of aid is determined without taking 
into account the actual needs of the mother. 
46. Virginia is an example of a state with such a policy. See Affidavit of Vicki Turetsky at 
2, Smyth v. Carter (W.D. Va. 1996) (96-0089-H). 
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whether they know the father's identity.47 President Clinton has 
proposed requiring states to adopt such policies.4s 
The cooperation requirement first appeared in 1975.49 Congress 
apparently believed that collecting child support on behalf of 
AFDC recipients would prove to be fiscally efficient, because the 
support monies would reimburse states and the federal government 
for their AFDC assistance.so As a long-term benefit, Congress ap­
parently wanted to deter fathers from leaving the home, and also to . 
provide children with the benefit of an intact family.s1 Dual con-· 
cerns about the "absent" father and the unmarried mother appear 
throughout the legislative history of the cooperation requirement.sz 
The fiscal concerns underlying the cooperation requirement re­
sulted, in large part, from the success of welfare rights activists in 
increasing the number of women who receive AFDc.s3 The race of 
these new welfare recipients was increasingly black. The reappear­
ance of "morality" concerns about the breakup of the family in the 
form of the cooperation requirements can similarly be traced to the 
race of the new recipients.s4 The Moynihan report had been issued 
in the previous decade, and there was special concern with the 
structure of black families.ss Thus, the cooperation requirement 
can be seen as a reaction to the number of poor black women re­
ceiving AFDC. 
47. See Spencer S. Hsu, Virginia Suffers Setback on Welfare Benefit Rule; In Case of 2 
Women, Judge Suspends Regulation on Identifying Fathers, WASH. PosT, June 26, 1996, at Al 
(identifying similar regulations that had been struck down in Massachusetts, and noting that 
South Carolina intended to adopt a comparable policy); see also Defenders of Welfare, WASH. 
TIMES, June 24, 1996, at Al8, available in LEXIS, News Library, \VTIMES File. 
48. See New Welfare Rules Imposed, DES MOINES REGISTER, June 19, 1996, at SA. 
49. See Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101 (Jan. 4, 1975); Kelly, supra note 43, at 247 n.1. 
50. See 120 CONG. REc. 40,323-24; 41,653 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1356, at 42-43 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8146. 
51. See S. REP. No. 93-138, at 42 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8146. 
52. For example, the Senate Report to the Social Service Amendments of 1974 stated, "It 
is in those families in which the father is 'absent from the home' that the most substantial 
growth [in AFDC recipients] has occurred." S. REP. No. 93-1356, at 42-43 (1974), reprinted 
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8146. 
53. See Amott, supra note 23, at 287; id. at 288 ("As a result of welfare rights organizing 
among the poor, welfare rolls expanded dramatically. Between 1970 and 1973 alone, the 
average number of recipients rose nearly 50 percent" (footnote omitted)); Joel F. Handler, 
The Transformatwn of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in 
Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 489 (1987-88). 
54. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Irrationality and Sacrifice in the Welfare Reform Consensus, 
81 VA. L. REv. 2607, 2621 (1995) ("[A]s AFDC became increasingly associated with black 
mothers, it became increasingly burdened with behavior modification, work requirements 
and reduced effective benefit levels."). 
55. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY! THE CASE FOR NATIONAL 
ACTION (1965); Kelly, supra note 43, at 248 n.3. 
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B. Images of the Cooperation Requirement 
Underlying the cooperation requirements are assumptions of 
noncooperation, irresponsibility, and immorality; the requirements 
take a punitive approach toward both mothers and fathers.56 The 
stern sanction for failure to comply with the requirement assumes 
that mothers are not telling the truth, or that they are deliberately 
withholding information about the father.57 The attempt to coerce 
paternal involvement assumes that fathers will not otherwise as­
stime responsibility for their families. 
1. Mothers 
When discussing recent changes to the cooperation require­
ments that would require mothers to provide information before 
they were eligible to receive AFDC, President Clinton used the 
term "responsibility": 
[W]e must do more to insist on more parental responsibility .... For 
too long, we have let the men off the hook. We must insist that they 
do their part to support the children that they help to bring into this 
world .... Our system should say to mothers, "If you want our help, 
help us to identify and locate the father so he can be held accountable 
as well." And it should say to fathers, "We're not going to let you just 
walk away."58 
Or, as an editorial on the cooperation requirement phrased it, the 
issue is "whether taxpayers are obliged to support not just welfare 
but welfare for anonymous one-night stands."59 In these formula­
tions, irresponsibility is a label attached to the behavior of both 
mothers and fathers: mothers have failed to provide information, 
and fathers have failed to act as responsible fathers.60 
The cooperation requirement has come to stand for illegiti­
macy. 61 Coinciding with the increasing number of African Ameri-
56. See Robert Pear, Clinton Announces Steps to Find Parents Who Owe Child Support, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1996, at A14 (quoting an advocate who noted the government's as­
sumption that the mother would not cooperate). 
57. See Affidavit of Vicki Turetsky, supra note 46, at 3. 
58. President Bill Clinton, Remarks at the American Association of Nurses Meeting 
(June 18, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. 
59. Defenders of Welfare, supra note 47; see also Susan Everitt, If Parents Were So Great, 
Why Did CPS Have Child?, ARiz. REPUBUC, Oct. 22, 1994, at B9 ("When does the public 
stop paying for the illegal and immoral acts of irresponsible parents?"). 
60. For further criticism of single-mother households, and the need for fathers to assume 
the paternal role, see DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OuR 
MoST URGENT SocIAL PROBLEM (1995); Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47. 
61. See Defenders of Welfare, supra note 47 (quoting Robert Rector of the Heritage 
Foundation). 
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can welfare recipients, AFDC is transformed into a condemnation 
of the mother's morality, rather than a program for meeting the 
needs of children.62 By admitting that a child was conceived as a 
result of a one-night stand with a man whose social security number 
she does not know, the mother's actual cooperation is irrelevant.63 
She must meet certain standards of responsibility not just in how 
much she must report, but also in the behavior that she is reporting. 
The reporting standards appear to be punishing the underlying 
behavior. 
Indeed, "responsibility" has become a code word in contempo­
rary welfare debates.64 Society views women who have additional 
children while on welfare as immoral, irresponsible, and undeserv­
ing, in contrast to wealthier woman who can "afford" to have chil­
dren. 65 In an essay that compares the reasons that poor IIlV­
infected mothers and infertile women have children, Carol Sanger 
notes: 
[I]f we accept motherhood as a good choice for women whose lives 
are rich in resources because it is understood to be a source of self­
and community esteem, of family life, of continuity, and of loving re­
lationships, then the decision to have a child when made by women 
with few external resources, should make similar sense.66 
The cooperation requirement is simply another example of an 
attempt to impose morality on women.67 The nature of the cooper­
ation requirement is such that it may require close questioning of 
the woman's sexual history. Many states have developed paternity 
62. See Mink, supra note 38. 
63. See Order, Smyth v. Carter (W.D. Va. 1996) (No. 96-0089-H); Complaint, Smyth (No. 
96-0089-H); Attached Exhibit A, Smyth (No. 96-0089-H) (challenging Virginia regulation 
that withholds benefits from women who are unable to provide the full names of their chil­
dren's father(s)); Hsu, supra note 47, at Al (noting that Massachusetts had a similar policy). 
64. See Handler, supra note 53, at 462 (contrasting the "entitlements" ideology of welfare 
reform in the 1960s and 1970s with the "responsibility" ideology of the 1980s). For a full 
discussion of responsibility in the context of welfare reform and pregnancy, see Linda C. 
McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996). 
65. See FINEMAN, supra note 22 (discussing the moral deviance of the category of single 
mothers); McClain, supra note 64; Williams, supra note 5; M.M. Slaughter, Fantasies: Single 
Mothers and Welfare Reform, 95 CoLUM. L REv. 2156 (1995) (book review). 
66. Carol Sanger, M is  for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S Sroo. 15, 63 
(1992); see also Roberts, supra note 54, at 2608-09 (discussing the belief that the poor are 
immoral for bearing children they cannot support); Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial Support 
of Children and the End of Welfare as We Know It, 81 VA. L. REV. 2523, 2523-24 (1995) 
(describing the "conservative" view, in which it is "morally reckless" to have additional chil­
dren without sufficient financial resources). 
67. The welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996 contained $250 million for "abstinence 
education," and $400 million in extra money to states that controlled their "illegitimate" 
birthrates. See Joyce Purnick, Welfare Bill: Legislating Morality?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, 
at Bl. 
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questionnaires that ask about sexual activity around the time that 
the child was conceived.68 There seems to be no understanding of 
the loss of dignity that accompanies questions regarding the 
woman's sexual history.69 Especially in light of the historical treat­
ment of black women's sexuality in this country, the cooperation 
requirement is particularly punitive.10 
2. Fathers 
For fathers, there are comparable assumptions of irresponsibil­
ity and noncooperation.71 Indeed, one of the purposes of the coop­
eration requirement was to ensure that fathers remained present in 
their children's lives; thus revealing an underlying assumption that, 
without such an incentive, fathers would not participate in child 
rearing. That is, unless they are coerced into paying money, fathers 
not only will not support their children, but will also remain 
uninvolved in their children's lives, abandoning the family itself.72 
So coercive is this requirement that fathers who provide support are 
essentially required to support not only their own children, but also 
any other children in the family. The so-called sibling rule deems 
any income received to be part of the entire family's income. Thus, 
the child of an AFDC mother with a relatively wealthy father is 
supported in the same manner as her half-siblings, whose father(s) 
may be poorer.73 
68. See James W. Johnson & Adele M. Blong, The AFDC Child Support Cooperation 
Requirement, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1388, 1397, 1399 (1987); Elaine Mccrate, Accounting 
for the Slowdown in the Divorce Rate in the 1980s: A Bargaining Perspective, 50 REV. Soc. 
EcoN. 404, 414 (1992) (citing 1991 Vermont Paternity Questionnaire). 
69. See Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: New Pat­
terns in the Search for Equality, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 337, 343 (1996) (discussing how the 
contemporary paradigms of equality do not comprehend the injuries suffered by young black 
unmarried mothers). 
70. See HAZEL V. CARBY, RECONS1RUCl1NG WOMANHOOD 26-27 (1987) (discussing 
images of the black woman's "overt sexuality" in contrast to the cult of true {white) woman­
hood's image of modesty); Brown et al., supra note 23, at 529-37 (discussing "The Promiscu­
ity Myth for Poor Women"); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (arguing that rape laws have not adequately protected 
black women because society assumes that they are sexually promiscuous); Dorothy E. Rob­
erts, The Genetic Tze, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209 {1995). · 
71. See also Chambers, supra note 26, at 2576 ("The irresponsibility of fathers takes three 
forms: they bring into the world 'illegitimate' children they do not intend to support, they 
leave marriages they should remain in, and, whether married or not, they fail to pay support 
for the children they leave behind."). 
72. For discussion of the relationship between visitation and child support, see Karen 
Czapanskiy, Child Support and Vrsitation: Rethinking the Connections, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 619 
(1989). 
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1994); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Amy E. 
Hirsch, income Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to Make 
Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 713 (1987-88). Until 1984, a 
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Images of the "absent father" suggest a dysfunctional family 
structure, one that allegedly characterizes low-income families.74 
Indeed, the Moynihan report of 1965 linked African American pov­
erty to the absence of black fathers.75 While advocates of paternal 
presence assume that the absent father is responsible for many so­
cial problems, and thus believe that keeping fathers involved will 
cure those problems, this is not necessarily true. First, the history of 
the black family is not about the absence of fathers.76 Historically, 
contrary to the Moynihan report, black families have been stable. 
In detailed research, Herbert Gutman concluded that slavery was 
not responsible for the disintegration of black families, and instead 
blamed an absence of work for any such crumbling.77 Black fa­
thers, then, have been a strong presence within their families. 
Nonetheless, while the involvement of fathers is generally a 
good thing, it is not always critical or beneficial. First, fathers may 
be absent for "good cause," such as violence between the parents7s 
or against the children. For example, more than half of all partici­
pants in welfare-to-work programs appear to be domestic violence 
victims.79 Numerous studies have shown that children are healthier 
in a violence-free environment, albeit one without a father, than in 
mother did not have to include all of her children on the welfare grant; she could receive 
child support for one child, while receiving AFDC for her other children. See Bowen, 107 S. 
Ct. at 3013. 
74. The rate of marriage for black men and women has been declining steadily since the 
1960s. See Robert D. Mare & Christopher Winship, Socioeconomic Change and the Decline 
of Marriage for Blacks and Whites, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 175, 175, 181 (Christopher 
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991). 
75. See p A TRICIA Hn.L COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT. KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUS­
NESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 73-75 (1990) (discussing how the image of black 
women as matriarchal has affected the harshness of public policy toward poor families); 
MoYNnIAN, supra note 55, at 5-14. 
76. See Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 W1s. 
L. REv. 399, 423-24 (discussing reasons why women form single-parent households); Nancy 
E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1995); Martha L.A. 
Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 
2195 (1995) (addressing the perniciousness of assumptions about the "normal" family). 
77. See HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-
1925, at 461-68 (1976). Gutman carefully documents familial relationships among slaves and 
ex-slaves. 
78. See Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character, and Social Change in the Welfare Re· 
form Debate, 19 LAw & PoLY. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 10, on file with author). 
79. See id. at 6. 
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a household with violent fathers.so While the cooperation require­
ment includes an exemption for good cause, it is under-utilized.s1 
Second, a father's presence may not be necessary for the well­
being of the children. It is poverty, not absent fathers, that corre­
lates most highly with negative outcomes for children, such as delin­
quency.82 While some studies show that children in single-parent 
households are more likely to become delinquents than are those in 
two-parent families, and those in extended families,s3 these data 
show that it is having at least two parents - neither (or none) of 
whom may be a father - that correlates with better outcomes. Of 
course, poverty correlates with the absence of a father - the most 
common reason for women to begin receiving AFDC is the depar­
ture of a father84 - but this is due to women's lower earning ability 
and the economic structure, rather than the per se absence of an­
other parent in the family.ss Indeed, delinquent children are more 
likely to have lived in poverty than to have lived in a single-headed 
80. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Do­
mestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991); Evan Stark & 
Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective on Child Abuse, 18 
INT. J. HEALTI-1. SERVICES 97, 106 (1988). 
81. See Mary R. Mannix et al., The Good Cause Exception to the AFDC Child Support 
Cooperation Requirement, 21 Cl.EAruNGHOUSE REV. 339 {1987). Welfare reform activists are 
currently seeking to clarify the good-cause standard so that more domestic violence victims 
can use it. See Telephone Interview with Joan Meier, Professor of Clinical Law and Director 
of Domestic Violence Advocacy Project, George Washington University Law School (July 
20, 1996). 
82. See Sara McLanahan & Karen Booth, Mother-Only Families: Problems, Prospects, 
and Politics, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557, 573 (1989) (stating that although poverty is not the 
full explanation, "we know that a significant part of children's lower attainment [from single­
family households] is due to economic deprivation in the family of origin"); Gary B. Melton, 
Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL L. REv. 1993, 2003 
(1993) ("[P]overty accounts for the greatest portion of variance in community rates of delin­
quency . . . •  "); see also Dowd, supra note 76, at 32-34 {discussing the effects of poverty on 
children and parents); Joel F. Handler, Two Years and You're Out, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 857, 862 
{1994) (noting that poverty, not the receipt of welfare, is associated with higher risks of delin­
quency). Of course, as Sara McLanahan and Karen Booth suggest, ultimately the entire con­
cept of single motherhood is "highly politicized," fraught with competing values. See 
McLanahan & Booth, supra, at 569; see also Dowd, supra note 76 (arguing that single moth-
erhood is unjustly stigmatized). 
· 
83. See James Q. Wilson, The Family-Values Debate, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1993, at 26 (cit­
ing a study by Sheppard Kellam). 
84. See Ellwood & Bane; supra note 9, at 28, 54. Ellwood & Bane's study shows that 
wives who become the head of household {because of the husband's absence) account for 
42.1 % of people beginning their first spell on welfare, while unmarried women with children 
account for 38.8% of all new entries. See id. at 54. The most common reason for women 
leaving welfare was marriage. See id. at 57. 
85. As Nancy Dowd points out, only 2% of single households headed by a man are in 
poverty, while almost 50% of single households headed by a woman are in poverty. See 
Dowd, supra note 76, at 34. 
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household.86 While child support collection efforts attempt to pro­
mote paternal financial and emotional support, the plain fact is that 
many of the men simply do not have the financial resources to sup­
port their families adequately; child support collection is not a pan­
acea for poverty. 
Third, black children in two-parent families still have much 
higher poverty rates than do white children who are in single-parent 
households.81 Simply requiring paternal presence is not a guaran­
tor of affluence, especially in light of the limited job opportunities 
for black men. The unemployment rate for African American men 
is much higher than for white men.88 
C. Realities Behind the Cooperation Requirement 
The actual facts are very different from the apparent images of 
noncooperation. Studies of welfare recipients, of fathers, and of 
narratives in court cases portray a very different image from that 
assumed by AFDC. 
1. Actual Behavior of Mothers and Fathers 
Most AFDC recipients do provide information about the father, 
and child support agency directors generally believe that mothers 
are willing to cooperate in establishing the father's identity.89 In­
deed, women have sued their local child support offices to force 
them to pursue support orders.9o Women are, then, more than will­
ing to cooperate. One study of custodial parents who had not yet 
obtained a child support order found that all of the mothers had 
provided the father's name, 75% had provided his home address, 
54% had provided his social security number, and 50% had pro­
vided his work address.91 Most other studies report similarly high 
86. See, e.g., Pierre Thomas, These Kids are the Throwaways of Society, WASH. PoST, 
Mar. 18, 1996, at AS. 
Erl. See McClain, supra note 64, at 361. 
88. For black men, the average unemployment rate is 12%, compared to 5.4% for white 
men; and the percentage of black men living below poverty level is 20%, compared to 7% for 
white men. See Connie Cass, Many Black Men Face Fear, Distrust, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 
Oct 16, 1995, at 2A, available in LEXIS, News Library, RMTNEW file. 
89. See Affidavit of Vicki Turetsky, supra note 46, at 4. 
90. See, e.g., Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. 
Blessing v. Freestone, 116 S. Ct. 1671 {1996) (detailing the inadequacies of the state's child 
support collection process); Howe v. Ellenbecker, 774 F. Supp. 1224 (D.S.D. 1991), affd., 8 
F.3d 1258 (8th Cir. 1993) (same). 
91. See NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE CONSORTIUM, CHILDHOOD'S END! 
WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT ENFORCED 
(1993), cited in Aff. of Vicki Turetsky, supra note 46, at 4 n.6. 
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levels of cooperation.92 The establishment of paternity appears to 
depend instead on the competency and efficiency of the local child 
support agency, so that "systemic factors, not individual noncompli­
ance,"93 are the main problem. Noncooperation by the mother, 
then, is not nearly as important as improving collection procedures 
within the social services agencies. 
When it comes to fathers, there are two different stories: while 
some putatively absent fathers are in fact present, others do not 
even see themselves as fathers. On the one hand, far from aban­
doning the family uilit, "absent" fathers often provide regular sup­
port "under the table."94 In her study of how AFDC recipients 
were able to support themselves, Kathryn Edin found that more 
women received money from absent fathers outside of the child 
support system than did so through the system - twenty-three per­
cent versus fifteen percent.95 Almost one-quarter of the recipients 
in her study, then, acknowledged receiving unreporte4 money from 
92. See id. Kathryn Edin has reported two conflicting results: in one study, she con­
cluded that more than half of AFDC recipients engaged in covert noncooperation with re­
spect to child support, and in another study, she concluded that virtually every mother 
cooperated. See Declaration of Ann Nichols-Casebolt at 7, Smyth v. Carter (W.D. Va. 1996) 
(No. 96-0089-H) (discussing both studies). 
93. Declaration of Ann Nichols-Casebolt, supra note 92, at 6. Slightly more than one­
third of the AFDC recipients who were eligible for a child support order actually had one. 
See ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE EcoNoMics OF CmLD 
SuPPORT 27 tbl. 2.3 (1993). In 1979, 415% of recipients had a child support award, and, by 
1986, this figure had dropped to 36.4%. See id. 
94. See Affidavit of Vicki Turetsky, supra note 46; Ellwood & Bane, supra note 9; Memo­
randum from Michael R. Henry, Assistant Commissioner, Virginia Department of Social 
Services, to John Littel & Eric Berger 2 (Nov. 4, 1994) (on file with the Virginia Department 
of Social Services) (reporting that Virginia caseworkers believed that less than 3% of recipi­
ents were receiving covert support, but that the low number might be due to the state's 
failure to catch such payments). 
95. See KAnmYN EDIN, THE MYIHs OF DEPENDENCE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCT: WOMEN, 
WELFARE, AND Low-WAGE WoR.K 11 tbl. 6 (Rutgers Ctr. for Urban Pol. Res. Working Pa­
per No. 67, 1994) [hereinafter EDIN, MYTIIS OF DEPENDENCE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY]. In 
another study, Edin concluded: 
[T]he fathers of welfare reliant children are much more involved in bearing at least some 
financial responsibility for their children than official statistics show. Thirty-three per­
cent of the women in our sample reported that they received regular financial support 
from the fathers of their children, though only 14 percent received any of that support 
through official channels. Another 30 percent of the mothers we interviewed said that 
although they didn't get cash assistance, they received in-kind contributions such as dis­
posable diapers, school clothing and shoes, and/or Christmas and birthday gifts. 
KATHRYN EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS: THE POSSIBilII1ES AND LIMITS 
OF Cmw SUPPORT POLICY 8 (Rutgers Ctr. for Urban Pol. Res. Working Paper 68, 1994) 
[hereinafter EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS]. 
Even caseworkers acknowledge that few of the fathers in welfare cases are men who earn 
a lot of money and do not pay child support. See Rick Bragg, Rethinking Welfare: Collecting 
from Fathers - A Special Report: Georgia, Pursuing Child Support, Discovers its Potential 
and Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1995, at Al. 
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the fathers, even outside of a formal child support order.96 We have 
no way of measuring the actual number of fathers who provide such 
support, given the tendency to underreport such behavior and the 
limited means for measuring support. 
On the other hand, some fathers provide no support at all. 
Many fathers who may otherwise be involved with their families are 
unable to provide support because their income is so low. Forcing 
such fathers to pay further impoverishes them. Within poor black 
communities, the unemployment rate of men has experienced a 
steady increase, and jobs are difficult to find.97 Other black fathers 
are literally absent from the family. First, ethnographers report 
that poor black men do not see themselves as fathers, and thus are 
simply not around for their families.98 Second, even devoted fa­
thers may be absent because they are in prison. The rate of incar­
ceration of black men is staggeringly high.99 For example, Kathryn 
Edin found that of the 112 mothers who had complied with child 
support officials but were not receiving any money from the fathers, 
twenty of the fathers were not employed, and another twenty of the 
fathers were incarcerated.100 
Third, as discussed earlier, there may be good reasons, such as 
domestic violence, that the fathers are absent. As with many ste­
reotypes, the image of the "absent" father is partially true. The rea­
sons for his absence, however, do not support broad 
generalizations. 
There is, as David Chambers points out, "no easy answer" to the 
questio� of whether parents who earn below the poverty level 
96. This number may be even higher, depending on the willingness of study participants 
to .acknowledge illegal income. Edin also found that 29% of the women received covert 
contributions from their boyfriends, which also shows male responsibility. See EDIN, MYrns 
OF DEPENDENCE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 95, tbl. 6. 
97. See William Julius Wilson,. Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1996, § 6 {Magazine), at 27. A 
father's income has been positively correlated to his child support payments. See BELLER & 
GRAHAM, supra note 93, at 78-79 • .  Beller and Graham report on a study that found that the 
fathers of children receiving AFDC have very few financial assets; only half of the fathers 
even owned a car. See id. at 79. · 
98. See infra note 109. 
99. Blacks are incarcerated at a much higher rate than whites - in 1989, the rate of 
incarceration was seven times greater. See SIDEL, supra note 5, at 179. Almost one-third of 
black men in their twenties are involved in the criminal justice system. See Ted Gest, A 
Shocking Look at Blacks and Crime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 16, 1995, at 53, 53. 
100. See EDIN, SINGLE MonmRs AND ABSENT FAnmRs, supra note 95, at 11. Thirty-six 
women received no support because the father could not be found; two mothers did not 
know the father's identity; seven mothers had good-cause exemptions because of the father's 
violent history; and 41 mothers had cases caught in the child support system. See id. 
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should be'required to pay support.101 While the requirement to pay 
may promote parental responsibility, the amount collected may be 
so minimal as to scarcely justify the effort.102 
2. Narratives in Legal Challenges to Cooperation Requirements 
In cases challenging the cooperation requirement, advocates 
employ narratives that speak on three different levels: legal, socio­
economic, and emotional. These narratives challenge the images of 
irresponsibility and show the actual effects on families of the AFDC 
cooperation requirements.103 The legal narratives are straightfor­
ward assertions of the constitutional and statutory claims of the 
AFDC recipients. The socioeconomic and emotional narratives 
add "color" to the legal assertions by portraying the life situations 
of the AFDC recipients. Even if the plaintiff's race is not men­
tioned in the complaints or in briefs, or is sometimes visible only by 
· implication ("from Puerto Rico"), race appears, obviously, in the 
courtroom whenever the plaintiffs are present; it may also appear 
through testimony of expert witnesses. 
Nonetheless, there is virtually no mention of race in court opin­
ions. While race may appear in the advocacy efforts, it simply does 
not appear in the judicial representation of women challenging the 
cooperation requirements, even though it is clearly -present in the 
media and undoubtedly has influenced the structure of American 
welfare programs. To show the technical separation of r�ce from 
judicial reasoning, I tum to an Illinois child support cooperation 
case. 
In 1986, an Illfuois federal district court certified as a class 
AFDC recipients whose benefits were terminated as a result of 
their failure to cooperate with the state in establishing paternity or 
obtaining child support.104 The class challenged state policies that 
implemented the cooperation requirement. One policy invalidated 
all excuses, including illness or inclement we.ather, for a recipient's 
101. See Chambers, supra note 26, at 2595; Beller & Graham, supra note 93, at 258. In 
discussing the significance of race to images of welfare dependency, Lisa Crooms also sug­
gests that the noncustodial parents of children on AFDC may be unable to pay because of 
their own poverty. See Crooms, supra note 5, at 1972 n.84. 
102. See Chambers, supra note 26, at 2592 n.79 (reporting that the federal government 
experienced a loss of $170 million in its child support collection program in 1992). 
103. See Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture and the Rhetoric 
of Rights, in CRmCAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTIING EDGE 502, 505-06 (Richard Delgado 
ed., 1995). 
104. See Doston v. Duffy, 732 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill. 1988). For a fuller discussion of the 
facts, see Doston v. Duffy, No. 85C2356, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 
1988). 
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failure to appear for an appointment, so that the state could termi­
nate an AFDC grant for even a single nonappearance.105 Other 
policies allowed caseworkers to determine what the AFDC recipi­
ent's knowledge should be about the absent parent, rather than re­
lying on the client's actual knowledge.106 
The stories of two of the named plaintiffs show how these poli­
cies affected recipients and their children. Geraldine Doston 
missed a court hearing because her child was ill. She called her 
lawyer on the morning of the hearing to inform the state attorney's 
office that she would be unable to appear, and the attorney was 
able to get a continuance for a date six months later. Ms. Doston 
appeared at the later hearing. In the interim, however, she was 
deemed noncooperative, and her AFDC grant was reduced by 
about one-third.101 
The court recounted the experience of another named plaintiff, 
Rosa P., whose grant was cut by more than fifty percent because of 
her alleged noncooperation: 
Rosa testified that she knew Peter [the putative father] for approxi­
mately one month in 1983. She had sexual relations with him four or 
five times at her home. When interviewed . . . Rosa gave Peter's 
name, birth date, the street he lived on in Chicago, a physical descrip­
tion, birth place, and that he was planning to go to Texas. According 
to [the caseworker's] notes, Rosa stated that she dated Peter from 
November 1983 to September 1984. Apparently because of the 
length of the relationship, [the caseworker] believed that Rosa should 
know more about Peter and concluded that she was not 
cooperating.108 
At the trial, the plaintiffs called Donna Franklin, a social work pro­
fessor at the University of Chicago. Professor Franklin testified as 
to the transience of poor black men and the consequent difficulties 
of locating them; she also testified that black women were dispro­
portionately more likely than black men to identify themselves as 
105. See Doston, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, at **16-17. For a discussion of the various 
reasons that poor clients may miss appointments with their lawyers, see Naomi Cahn, 
"Money Changes Everything": Class Differences in Representation (1996) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
106. See Doston, 732 F. Supp. at 862. 
107. See Doston, 1988 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17375, at *61. 
108. Doston, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, at *64. Other AFDC recipients tell similar 
stories about what constitutes their "noncooperation." See, e.g., Complaint, Smyth v. Carter, 
(No. 96-0089) (W.D. Va.). 
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parents.109 Another witness testified about the low level of literacy 
among the poor in the United States.no 
The plaintiffs, then, used legal, socioeconomic, and racial narra­
tives to argue their case, and the judge clearly considered these nar­
ratives because he mentioned them in the findings of fact.111 
Nonetheless, in its conclusions of law, the court never mentioned 
the interrelationship of the cooperation requirements and the struc­
ture of black communities - although the court did find the coop­
eration requirements too harsh. Indeed, outside of Professor 
Franklin's testimony, race does not otherwise appear in the court's 
opinion. The description of the plaintiffs is completely race-less, so 
the reader does not even know why Professor Franklin's testimony 
is relevant. Race is similarly absent in other decisions on the coop- . 
eration requirement.112 The choice not to address race serves, of 
course, to mark and reinforce the notion that welfare reform litiga­
tion is seemingly colorblind.113 
Il. GENDER IDEOLOGY 
Poor black men and women occupy separate raced and 
gendered spaces in our culture.114 As African Americans, they are 
both perceived as part of the underclass in our society;ns however, 
109. See Doston, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, at *70. 
In a survey of poor black women in the 18-44 age group, 69.7% indicated that they were 
parents. In the same age group, only 392% of the males responded that they were 
parents . . . .  [T]he differential for other socioeconomic groups is in the range of five to 
seven percent. Ethnographers attribute some of the disparity to transiency among the 
population. 
Doston, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, at *70. 
110. See Doston, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, at **73-75. 
111. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS, 
Spring 1990, at 42, 57 ("So, even the initial, straightforward description of the facts used by 
the court . . .  is full of law . . . .  "). 
112. See, e.g., Smyth v. Carter, No. 96-0089-H (W.D. Va. June 25, 1996) (order denying 
motion for class certification). The notion of judicial neutrality is a myth. See JOHN M. CON­
LEY & WILUAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSIDPS: THE ETiiNOGRAPHY OF 
LEGAL D1scouRSE 82-125 (1990) (discussing the contracts between actual variability among 
judges and the popular notion of judicial neutrality and consistency); Judith Resnik, On the 
Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 s. CAL L. REV. 1877 
(1988) (discussing the aspiration of judicial impartiality and concluding that it cannot be 
achieved). Discretionary decisionmaking is invariably influenced by race. See Flagg, supra 
note 14, at 983-85. 
113. See Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of Individual­
ism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1445 (1995). 
114. See John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a 
Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair, " 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (1995),. 
115. See Russell, supra note 113, at 1447; Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: 
Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE LJ. 719, 743 (1992); see also 
Paul Butler, Willie Horton Scares All White People: Poor, Middle Income, Rich (materials 
prepared for the Conference on Critical Networks, Mar. 1995) (on file with author). 
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as men and women, they are perceived differently. Poor black men 
are generally depicted as delinquents who are inadequately present 
in the home because they are in the street or in prison;116 they are 
encouraged to spend more time with their families and provide 
more support.117 Poor black women are generally depicted as un­
married mothers and high school dropouts; they are encouraged to 
leave the home for school or work through learnfare or workfare 
programs. Women are home-based and domestic, while men are 
"active" in the outside world. Paradoxically, then, while both 
images traditionally have had positive attributes when applied to 
whites - women are nurturing, men are rational - they are al­
most completely negative when applied to poor black men and 
women. 
There is an anger toward welfare mothers for staying at home 
and taking care of their children, and toward poor fathers for alleg­
edly deserting their children. While this anger conforms to tradi­
tional notions of the male role, it contradicts traditional women's 
roles: women are supposed to stay home and take care of children. 
Ironically, the purpose of the mother's pensions laws, and, at least 
in part for its first thirty years, of AFDC, was to enable women to 
stay at home with their children and remain homemakers.118 The 
state provided financial aid as a substitute for having a man in the 
house, or for women leaving the house to work. It was only as 
more blacks - and unmarried women generally - received wel­
fare that the expectations began to change. 
Black women have always worked outside of the home.119 Es­
tablishing programs such as workfare simply institutionalizes 
images of black women as workers, rather than mothers. It also 
punishes black women for seeking to enjoy some of the preroga-
116. Young black men are incarcerated at a much higher rate than whites, given compara­
ble numbers of crimes committed. See MARC MAUER, YouNG BLACK MEN & THE CRIMI· 
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM 3 (The Sentencing Projecting 1995) 
(study found that one in four black men between the ages of 20 and 29 are either in jail, in 
prison, or on probation). 
117. Black male filmmakers celebrate the importance of fathers. See Michele Wallace, 
Boyz N the Hood and Jungle Fever, in BLACK POPULAR CULTURE 123, 125 (Gina Dent ed., 
1992). 
118. See Sugarman, supra note 66, at 2550; supra notes 29-32. 
119. See JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LoVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, 
WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985); PHYLLIS PALMER, DOMES· 
TICITY AND DIRT: HOUSEWIVES AND DOMESTIC SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-
1945 (1989). See generally Linda Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial 
Images, and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 
1995 Wis. L. REv. 1003 (discussing historical images of black women); Regina Austin, Sap· 
phire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539. 
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tives that white women have traditionally enjoyed, such as the lux­
ury of not working because of the necessity of caring for children.120 
Within the ideology of the cult of domesticity, men are the 
breadwinners. Indeed, in defining their roles, this is how men view 
themselves.121 Again, however, like black women, black men take 
their places outside of these traditional images. The child support 
cooperation requirement treats all men in a fashion that is consis­
tent with an image of noncooperation and abandonment. This dis­
paraging image of black men has deep historical roots. The 
dominant negative cultural image of the black man is as the savage 
and criminal beast,122 and this image is highly successful in influenc­
ing public policy.123 In the media, black men are portrayed as dan­
gerous, thereby influencing "legislators to seek immediate control 
of young Black men."124 Similarly, police profiles tend to single out 
black men as potential, or actual, criminals.12s 
120. Indeed, as Dorothy Roberts points out, welfare stigmatizes all single mothers be­
cause they are too similar to black women. See Dorothy Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in 
the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 26-27 (1993). As increasing num­
bers of mothers are forced to work outside the home, it seems unfair to many to support 
welfare mothers who stay at home. See Mink, supra note 38, at 882; Pappas, supra note 25, at 
1311. 
121. One recent poll found that a large percentage of both men and women link mascu­
linity to acting as a good provider. See Carol Iannone, Endangered Species?, NATL. REV., 
Sept. 25, 1995, at 91, 92 (reviewing ELUs CosE, A MAN'S WORLD: How REAL Is MALE 
PRIVILEGE - AND How HIGH Is ITS PruCE? (1995)). In another poll, almost half of the 
respondents believed that women should remain at home, while men should be breadwin­
ners. See Poll Finds Dissatisfaction with Politics, Country's Future, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Nov. 5, 1995, at UA, available in LEXIS, News Library, DALNWS File. 
122. See Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and 
Susan Smith - Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225, 229 n.12 (1996); Lawrence 
Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial 
Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 573 n.5 (1993). For discussion of 
this image historically, see William W. Fisher III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1051, 1058 (1993). 
123. As my colleague Paul Butler points out, "The image in the white imagination of the 
black man as a criminal is so strong that it is too successful at achieving its goal." Butler, 
supra note 115, at 646. 
124. Dwight L. Greene, Naughty by Nurture: Black Male Joyriding - Is Everything 
Gonna Be Alright?, 4 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 73, 84 (1994); see Adeno Addis, Recycling in 
Hell, 67 TuL L. REV. 2253, 2263 (1993) ("The media paints a picture of the black criminal 
threatening the innocence of white America. Indeed, 'crime' has virtually become a meta­
phor to describe young black men."); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black 
Crime, White Fears - On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REv. 503, 514 (1994). 
125. See Cunningham, supra note 14, at 1301 n.8 (discussing his client's race as a factor in 
his arrest); Davis, supra note 12, at 1661 (discussing race discrimination in criminal proce­
dure); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Conver­
gence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 762-66 (1992); Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEw YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 
56, 58-59 (discussing the experiences of African-American men stopped by police simply 
because of their race). 
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Maya Angelou explains that the caricatured black man, 
presented in minstrel shows, was someone " 'devoid of all sensibili­
ties and sensitivities. [Minstrel shows] minimized and diminished 
the possibility of familial love.' "126 Historically, black men who 
were slaves were unable to enter into binding marriages; they were 
frequently separated from their children with little thought.127 Un­
like white children, whose status was determined by their father, 
the status of black children was determined by their mother.128 It is 
the evocation of this caricature, that black men do not care about 
their children, that appears to inform efforts at child support en­
forcement. The reality behind this rhetoric contradicts the carica­
tured image. 
Ill CHANGING REPRESENTATION 
Race is certainly relevant to advocacy efforts writ large - that 
is, race affects how welfare is reformed. If only divorced or wid­
owed white women received welfare, we might expect welfare to 
look quite different.129 The very term "welfare" has now become 
associated with race, notwithstanding the many forms of welfare 
other than AFDC sponsored by the government. It is, conse­
quently, important to use race in advocacy efforts to show how leg­
islation affects blacks disproportionately, and how it reinforces 
negative images of blacks while using those same negative images 
to justify new and punitive requirements. There is a need to ac­
knowledge the impact of these negative stereotypes so that they can 
be confronted in the hope of changing policy. 
On the individual representation level, however, the relevance 
of race appears more questionable. In the child support area, the 
plaintiff 's race does not affect the applicability of the cooperation 
requirement, even though it may have been highly relevant to the 
existence of the requirement itself. On the other hand, race may 
affect the caseworker's perception of her "client," and it certainly 
affects the income potential of the father. In this area, it is impor­
tant for advocates to be aware of how race affects the representa­
tion process, and for advocates to use race to challenge the legal 
126. Gates, supra note 125, at 62 (quoting Maya Angelou). 
127. See, e.g., Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfie/d 
to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1, 23 {1995); 1\vila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Femi­
nism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 347 {1996). 
128. See Roberts, supra note 70, at 226. 
129. See Slaughter, supra note 65, at 2167 n.34. While earlier fonns of welfare also had 
morality requirements, they were eased during the late 1960s and early 1970s, only to be 
reimposed as welfare rolls have become increasingly black. 
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requirements placed on their clients. The difficult issues concern 
the relevance of race and deciding how to use it in the advocacy 
process. 
Thus, fathers' advocates could show that their client's inability 
to pay child support is based, at least in part, on employment dis­
crimination against blacks; and mothers' advocates could show how 
the cooperation requirement reinforces negative images of black 
motherhood. We need to expand the narratives available to both 
mothers and fathers. When race may be relevant, the advocate has 
the obligation to think through the implications of making race­
based claims a basis for arguments on the client's behalf, and has a 
corresponding obligation to discuss the utility and consequences of 
making such claims. 
In exploring race consciousness, it is useful to think about Ruth 
Frankenberg's three paradigms of race.130 Frankenberg developed 
her paradigms through interviews with white women to determine 
how they thought about race in their own lives. She argues that 
white women must recognize how race shapes their lives. Franken­
berg found that white women were located within a set of discursive 
paradigms of race.131 She defines the first, "essentialist racism," as 
an attitude in which racial difference means inequality,132 while the 
second, "color/blind racism" ignores differences based on race;133 
the third is "race cognizance," pursuant to which paying attention 
to racial differences becomes, itself, an antiracist strategy. Through 
race cognizance, whites self-consciously recognize "that race makes 
a difference in people's lives and that racism makes a difference in 
U.S. society,"134 but do not believe that racial difference leads to 
inferiority.135 The paradigm of race cognizance, or consciousness, 
provides a useful perspective on how to recognize race and its at­
tendant differences without using these differences as a subordinat­
ing tool; thinking carefully about the relevance of race need not 
lead to either racism or essentialism. 
130. See FRANKENBERG, supra note 14, at 138-40. Professor Martha Mahoney also uses 
Frankenberg's paradigm. See Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transforma­
tion, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1659, 1666-67 (1995). 
131. See FRANKENBERG, supra note 14, at 238-39. 
132. See id. at 14, 139. 
133. See id. This second paradigm parallels what Gary Peller terms the "integrationist" 
approach. See Peller, supra note 180, at 759-60; see also Flagg, supra note 14, at 953-56. 
134. FRANKENBERG, supra note 14, at 159. Professor Flagg advocates a somewhat similar 
approach, which involves "a deliberate and thorough-going skepticism regarding the race 
neutrality of facially neutral criteria of decision." Flagg, supra note 14, at 977. 
135. For a brief discussion of how race cognizance can empower whites, see Patricia Hill 
Collins, Book Review, 20 SIGNS 728, 731 (1995). 
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A. Race-Based Claims 
Thinking about the relevance of race suggests how advocates 
can develop alternative sets of arguments to supplement the ex­
isting legal stories.136 Race cognizance opens up additional case 
theories and strategies. 
1. Fathers 
Requiring poor fathers to pay child support is, at best, a ques­
tionable enterprise, not only because they may be unable to do so, 
but also because, even if they are able to do so, the amount of 
money spent in collecting the support may exceed the amount col­
lected. In their child support guidelines, most states set a minimum 
amount that all noncustodial parents must pay, regardless of their 
employment status. Such minimums are admirable attempts to en­
sure that fathers take responsibility, yet they do not account for the 
realities of involuntarily poor fathers.137 As has already been dis­
cussed, poor fathers often provide support under-the-table when 
they are able to do .so. Fathers may provide such support in the 
form of money, they may provide diapers whenever they are able to 
do so, or they may participate in other informal support 
processes.138 Given the existence of an underground economy, pur­
suant to which diapers might be discounted or traded for services, 
the fathers might not be able to provide the same financial 
equivalents if they were subject to strictly financially based child 
support orders. 
On the other hand, I do not advocate allowing fathers to evade 
responsibility for their children. Of course, when the father has 
been completely uninvolved in the child's life, and has had no rela­
tionship with the mother after the child's conception, he perhaps 
136. For other examples, see Cunningham, supra note 14; Miller, supra note 14, at 542, 
545 ("By starting with race, we can see a picture of the case that is very different from the 
one a traditionalist would see . . . .  Thinking about the incident • .  : as a racial encounter 
changes how we look at legal elements . . • .  "). 
137. For example, almost two-thirds of the fathers who would be affected by Congres­
sional legislation that would deny means-tested benefits to fathers who are more than two 
months delinquent in child support were unemployed; 50% of the affected fathers were re­
ceiving food stamps or were living in public housing. See Elaine Sorensen, Tapping "Dead­
beat " Dads No Cure-All for Poor Kids, PHOENIX GAZETIE, November 21, 1995 at B7, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, PHNXGZ File. 
138. My clients frequently explained to me that their children's fathers would leave 
"Pampers" - their term for diapers as well as other child-related objects - whenever they 
could afford to do so. Cf. EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS, supra note 95, at 
22 ("In our interviews with mothers of younger children, we found that Pampers (a generic 
term used to describe all disposable diapers) were a universally accepted symbolic expression 
of fatherhood for poor absentee fathers."). 
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should not be accountable, and correspondingly, the mother should 
not be responsible for providing information about him. In an 
ovenvhelming number of families, however, this will not be true 
because the fathers will be involved with their children139 and the 
mother should be expected to be candid with her caseworker. If 
the father has been involved with the mother, with the children, or 
both, then it seems fair to ask him to contribute in some way. Per­
haps he could care for the children while the mother works, thereby 
saving child care costs, or perhaps he should contribute financially, 
but not accumulate arrearages if he is unemployed for good 
cause.140 Requiring a :financial contribution, however, may not be 
the most appropriate method in all child support cases.141 
An alternative suggestion is that child support be sought from 
noncustodial parents only while they are working. While this might 
appear to be a disincentive to holding a job, such a perspective min­
imizes the reasons that the parent holds a job. Only a tiny minority 
of men would rather be, and can afford to be, unemployed than pay 
child support. And, under the current system, there are mecha­
nisms for dealing with fathers who become voluntarily unemployed 
so that they can evade child support responsibilities.142 Collection 
efforts need to distinguish between fathers who do all that they can, 
and fathers who are, literally, seeking to avoid responsibility. This 
becomes particularly important within black families, which have a 
139. One study found that most unwed fathers visit their children until age two. The 
study also found that only 12% of unwed black fathers versus 37% of white fathers and 30% 
of Latino fathers never visited their children. See Sheryl Stolberg, Teen Dads Who Didn't 
Run Away, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1996, at Al; Robert I. Lerman, A National Profile of Young 
Unwed Fathers, in YOUNG UNWED FATHERS, supra, at 27, 46. For a discussion of how fathers 
negotiate informal support mechanisms, see Mercer L. Sullivan, Young Fathers and Parenting 
in 1\vo Inner-City Neighborhoods, in YOUNG UNWED FATHERS: CHANGING RoLES AND 
EMERGING PouCIES 52 {Robert I. Lerman & Theodore J. Oons eds., 1993); Susan Chira, 
Novel Idea in Welfare Plan: Helping Children by Helping Their Fathers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
1994, at B6. Professor Lerman reports: "[W]e see two broad patterns of fathering. Half or 
more of unwed fathers live near their children, visit them often, and make child support 
payments. Most of the remaining group only rarely visit and usually make no payment 
whatever." Id. at 46. 
140. This is one of the solutions also suggested by Edin. See EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS 
AND ABSENT FATHERS, supra note 95, at 27-28. Even if 100% of child support were col­
lected, welfare would be reduced by only 25%. See Bragg, supra note 95, at D18 (quoting 
Professor Irwin Garfinkel}. 
141. Edin reports that she knows of no studies investigating whether fathers who make 
relatively small, covert contributions do ultimately make larger contributions as they earn 
more, but that her interviews indicated that such fathers were more likely to contribute at a 
later point than fathers who made no contributions at all. See EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND 
ABSENT FATHERS, supra note 95, at 23. When the father has been violent, financial contribu­
tions may be the only appropriate method of state-supported involvement. 
142. Most men will probably not quit their jobs because they are forced to pay child 
support. See Chambers, supra note 26, at 2596. 
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much higher rate of single-mother households than white 
families.143 
2. Mothers 
When it comes to issues of child support, a bottom-line assump­
tion must be that welfare recipients are cooperating. The problems 
with child support collection efforts go far beyond issues of cooper­
ation, as evidenced by the lawsuits against collection agencies and 
the studies on the amount of cooperation. If the women are not 
cooperating, then there may well be good cause for failing to do 
so.144 The actual good cause may vary, from domestic violence to 
:financial concerns. For example, if they are receiving money under­
the-table, which exceeds the extra fifty dollars available through a 
child support order, then they clearly will not want to relinquish 
such funds. And, given the realities of low welfare grants, this sup­
plemental support may mean the difference between making it and 
not making it.145 Or, they may believe that formal procedures 
would adversely affect the father-child relationship and thus be un­
willing to cooperate.146 Until the level of welfare grants, or the 
pass-through amount, is increased, perhaps "good cause" should be 
redefined to include :financial necessity, thus encouraging recipients 
to provide information about absent fathers without jeopardizing 
the additional income. 
Ideally, custodial parents who receive welfare should be able to 
decide whether to pursue fathers for child support.147 Cooperation 
143. See Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African Ameri­
can Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 43 (1995) (reporting that 
44% of African Ani.erican families are headed by single mothers, while single mothers head 
only 13% of white families). 
144. Kathryn Edin asserts that welfare recipients fail to comply with grant requirements 
only to ensure their day-to-day survival. See EDIN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS, 
supra note 95, at 14. 
145. Indeed, Edin found that not reporting support was a "rational strategy" because 
some women did receive more than the $50 pass-through; some women knew that the father 
would be unable to maintain regular child support payments; and some women believed that 
this form of payment improved the relationship between father and child. See EDIN, SINGLE 
MOTHERS AND ABSENT FATHERS, supra note 95, at 14-15. 
146. In the story told by Lisa Kelly, the custodial parent is very worried about this out­
come. See Kelly, supra note 43, at 250-56. 
147. See Deborah Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped in 
its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 619, 656 (1987-88) ("One alternative 
• . .  is to make child support enforcement voluntary for welfare mothers . . • .  It seems reason­
able to suppose that welfare mothers are just as able as nonwelfare mothers to decide 
whether (it is worthwhile to obtain a child support order]."). While giving women this choice 
does not address issues of fiscal responsibility, the amount of money foregone by the state 
would presumably be negligible, especially when compared with the administrative costs of 
collecting the support. 
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would no longer be mandatory, but voluntary. Wealthier women 
certainly have the choice of whether to pursue child support - it 
seems only fair to allow poor women to have the same option. 
While wealthier women do not need welfare grants, and thus do not 
require the same amount of public support as poorer women, they 
nonetheless receive some forms of public welfare, albeit in differ­
ently titled forms.148 Allowing recipient women the opportunity to 
make this choice would give them an appropriate level of control 
over their relationship with the fathers and with the welfare system. 
These welfare reforms would affect all poor women, black and 
white, and thus, as discussed at the beginning of the essay, may not 
appear "raced." Because, however, images of black recipients of 
welfare seem to motivate welfare reform, and given the impact of 
welfare reform on the black community, a race-conscious lawyering 
strategy may be warranted. A strategy is race conscious if it recog­
nizes how welfare policy affects the black community; the "welfare 
queen" image is black, not white, and legal narratives of blacks that 
do not conform serve to challenge that image and force courts to 
confront the realities that are obscured by rhetoric. 
B. The Relevance of Race for Representation 
Race consciousness is currently left out of professional responsi­
bility models149 and the lawyer-client representation process.150 
When race is obviously relevant to the representation, as with an 
African-American attorney representing the Ku Klux Klan, the role 
148. For example, the home mortgage deduction, chiid care credits, and social security. 
See GORDON, supra note 22, at 4-6; Matthews, supra note 22, at 41. 
149. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 20, at 1321 (noting that current ethical codes affirm a 
"colorblind vision of practice susceptible to racialized forms of narrative"); Barnes, supra 
note 19, at 793 (same). Sheri Johnson argues that the legal profession needs a "race-shield" 
law to prevent the negative use of racial images. For further discussion of her proposal, see 
infra note 165. 
The one place that race is beginning to appear in professional responsibility rules is in a 
prohibition against discrimination that has been adopted by approximately seventeen juris­
dictions. See Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why 
the First Amendment is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal 
Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 781-82 (1996). Colorado, Idaho, and Texas prohibit 
conduct or words that show bias or prejudice against any individual involved in the relevant 
legal proceedings. See CoLO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(f) (1996); IDAHO 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4(a) (1996); TEX. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON­
DUCT Rule 5.08 (1995). 
The professional responsibility rules developed to regulate a predominantly white profes­
sion; it is then no surprise that they lack race consciousness. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn, A Prelimi­
nary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 23 (1990). 
150. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REv. 
7, 16-18 (1990) (discussing how race is left out of a prominent text on the lawyering process). 
For suggestions on how to make students more conscious of such issues, see Hing, supra note 
16. 
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that race should have with respect to any aspect of the case is highly 
contested.151 Does an African-American attorney have a special 
obligation not to take such cases, or does she have an obligation to 
represent the otherwise unrepresented?1s2 While the lack of ex­
plicit condonation of, or prohibition on, race consciousness permits 
lawyers and clients to decide on the appropriate role of race in any 
particular representation, there is little consensus on frameworks153 
for lawyers who need to consider race, much less on whether race 
consciousness is beneficial in any context. Should lawyers think 
about race, especially when the case is not about explicitly racial­
ized issues? I offer below some tentative thoughts on the advisabil­
ity of race-conscious lawyering in certain contexts. 
1. Professional Responsibility Models 
Rules of professional responsibility generally privilege the cli­
ent's interests over any other interests, including those of the law­
yer, third parties, or communities.154 If the goals of the 
representation are set by the client's needs, it nonetheless remains 
the lawyer's responsibility, pursuant to traditional conceptions of 
the lawyer's role, to develop and implement the case strategy.155 
Although the rules allow lawyers to take into account moral con­
cerns beyond those explicitly raised by the client, there is no re­
quirement that this process occur. Scholarly justifications and 
admonitions for lawyers to consider the "common good" range 
from a belief that this directly benefits the individual, to more direct 
appeals to a generalized morality,156 to a recognition of the scarce 
151. See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Law­
yer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995). 
152. See Wilkins, supra note 151; David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The 
Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
1981 (1993). 
153. See, e.g., Anthony Alfieri, Colloquy: Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 800 
(1996); Barnes, supra note 19; Johnson, supra note 20. 
154. For comments on this, see Alfieri, supra note 153; Cahn, supra note 149; Bill Ong 
Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Com­
mon Good, 41 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1995); David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Law­
yers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955 (1995); Peter Margulies, "Who Are 
You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Inter­
ests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REv. 213 (1990); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawy­
ering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988). 
155. For a discussion of this responsibility, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: 
AN EnnCAL STUDY 159-60 (1988). 
156. See Hing, supra note 154; Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representa­
tion in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 984, 998 (1995) (arguing that the law 
provides a "shared moral standard to which both lawyer and client are properly held morally 
accountable"). 
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resources available within some communities.157 Calls for client­
centered lawyering try to place the client more directly in this pro­
cess so that the lawyer listens to the client in conducting the repre­
sentation. Ultimately, however, while power is constantly 
negotiated,158 it remains the responsibility of the lawyer to raise 
these concerns when the client does not do so. This section briefly 
explores the potential conflicts between client, community, and law­
yer in the representation envisioned by the traditional model of 
legal ethics. 
a. Zealous Advocacy, Part I: Community vs. Client Interests. 
Much of the controversy over racialized representation has oc­
curred in discussions of whether to privilege the "common good" 
over an individual's putative interest in cases that clearly present 
the opportunity to make arguments based on race.159 Thus, for ex­
ample, in exploring the ethical obligations of lawyers in cases in­
volving black-on-white violence, Professor Tony Alfieri suggests 
that criminal defense attorneys forego use of certain racialized sto­
ries of deviance in order to prevent the demeaning of client and 
community, even when such stories might, in the short run, help the 
client by preventing conviction.16° By telling such stories, he be­
lieves, lawyers run the risk of furthering the subordination of racial 
minorities. In response, Professor Robin Barnes argues that it is 
important for defense attorneys to use whatever stories will most 
likely acquit their clients; at worst, by using potentially subordinat­
ing narratives, lawyers run the risk of simply replicating existing 
hierarchies.161 
157. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1102-04 (1990). 
158. See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality 
and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1447, 1447-50 (1992); 
Lucie E. White, Seeking " • . .  The Faces of Otherness . . .  ": A Response to Professors Sarat, 
Felstiner, and Cahn, 11 CoRNELL L. REV. 1499, 1501-02 (1992). 
159. In addition to those scholars discussed in the text, see Hing, supra note 154 (sug­
gesting that lawyers be required to counsel their clients that certain courses of action might 
exacerbate racial tension in the community). 
In examining how a lawyer's own affiliation affects her representation, David Wilkins 
notes that questions about the "relationship among professional role, group affiliation, and 
personal morality arise in many more mundane areas of legal practice. Consider, for exam­
ple, a black lawyer defending a company accused of race discrimination, or a woman defend­
ing an accused rapist, or a Korean-American lawyer negotiating a joint venture with a 
Korean company." Wilkins, supra note 151, at 1068. Even in these examples, however, there 
is a potentially clear conflict based on race or sex. For a discussion of how a feminist can 
defend a rapist, see Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education 
of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 54-59 (1993). 
160. See Alfieri, supra note 20. 
161. See Barnes, supra note 19. 
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Underlying this debate, however, is an implicit acknowledgment 
that there will be actual conflicts between individual interests and 
the common good.162 Resolving these conflicts depends on whose 
story is privileged: the lawyer's (or client's) vision of a common 
good, the lawyer's (or client's) vision of what is best for the individ­
ual, or the profession's vision of what is best for society, regardless 
of the views of the lawyer or client.163 Conflicts between the com­
mon good and individual good are highlighted in racialized conflicts 
because the stories that could be told in such contexts do have the 
potential to perpetuate stereotypes and inflame interethnic ten­
sions. Recommendations that attorneys refrain from using these 
stereotypes are based on a perceived harm to the community, 
whatever the cost or benefit to the individual client; the counter­
arguments allege that the interests of the individual client must be 
privileged. 
For my purposes, the interesting aspect of these arguments is 
the focus on race consciousness. There is an underlying require­
ment that the attorneys think about the raced, and communal, im­
pact of their advocacy. This use of race cognizance in per se 
racialized conflicts should lead to questions about the importance 
of race consciousness in other types of cases, when race could be, 
but is not explicitly, an issue. 
Perhaps we should treat many more cases as involving racial 
tensions and thus develop rules that apply more universally, rather 
than requiring lawyers to decide whether their cases do involve 
such tensions, and then applying special rules to them. Under these 
circumstances, what we can hope for is that privileging one story is 
a deliberate step, undertaken by lawyer and client in consultation 
with each other, and perhaps with the relevant communities.164 
How this issue is resolved in any particular representation should, 
perhaps, not be subject to definitive rules, other than a requirement 
that the lawyer consider the impact on a community of her use of 
racialized images and discuss this assessment with the client.165 
162. For an early recognition of this conflict, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving 1lvo Mas­
ters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, BS YALE L.J. 
470 (1976). These conflicts are not, of course, inevitable. They do, however, implicate the 
issue of the lawyer's role as moral judge or zealous, single-minded advocate. 
163. See Hing, supra note 154, at 935-36 (discussing potential conflicts between a client· 
centered approach and his racialized-tension approach). 
164. See generally GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION 
OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). 
165. Perhaps racial stereotyping should be banned, except when it is used as a defensive 
shield. This policy would not, of course, preclude using statistics to show the impact of cer­
tain practices, as occurs in disparate impact employment discrimination litigation. See 42 
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b. Zealous Advocacy, Part II: Lawyer vs. Client. The decision 
of whether to raise moral concerns that go beyond the client's ac­
tual legal needs depends on the lawyer's actions. For example, will 
a lawyer choose to discuss the impact of a client's actions on her 
community, or will the lawyer choose to pursue nonadversarial 
techniques?166 That is, the very problem of whether to privilege the 
client or larger social goals must be solved by the lawyer. As Wil­
liam Simon points out, "[t]he Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering 
is that effective lawyers cannot avoid making judgments in terms of 
their own values and influencing their clients · to adopt those judg­
ments. "167 The lawyer chooses her clients, and then chooses what 
advice to offer, and how to conduct the representation.168 
On the other hand, the lawyer, at least pursuant to the profes­
sional responsibility rules, is supposed to separate her interests 
from those of her client scrupulously. The Model Rules provide 
that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of 
that client may be materially limited by the . . .  lawyer's own inter­
ests . . . .  "169 
The lawyer's perceived responsibilities to entities other than her 
client may, however, "limit" the representation110 and potentially 
conflict with the client's goals.171 How can a lawyer accommodate 
her own views and those of her client? There are three answers to 
this dilemma: the lawyer can disclose her potential conflicts and 
obtain the client's consent to continued representation, she can 
withdraw completely, or she can advocate for changes in the rules. 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2{k) (1994) {defining the burden of proof in disparate impact cases); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971); see also GARBUS, supra note 36, at 155 (using a 
race discrimination claim in welfare rights case); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Ad­
dicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. 
REV. 1419 {1991) {addressing race discrimination claims). 
166. Professor Hing received varying responses from lawyers in response to this question. 
See Hing, supra note 154, at 922-27. 
167. William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Pov­
erty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMr L. REv. 1099, 1102 
{1994); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEo. L.J. 2475, 2490-91 (1993). 
168. See Simon, supra note 167, at 1102-03. For a critique of this model that emphasizes 
the impossibility of creating separate domains for lawyer and client decisionmaking, see Alex 
J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collabora­
tion, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71 (1996). 
169. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1987); see also DOUGLAS 
E. RosENIHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHo's IN CHARGE? 95-116 {1972) {discussing con­
flicting interests of lawyers and clients); Cahn, supra note 149, at 36-37 (1990) (discussing the 
prohibition against conflicts of interest); Cahn, supra note 167, at 2522-23; Felstiner & Sarat, 
supra note 158 (discussing conflicting goals of lawyers and clients). 
170. See Wilkins, supra note 152, at 1984 (proposing that successful blacks have obliga­
tion to consider the interests of their communities). 
171. See Cahn, supra note 167, at 2523. 
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The problem, under existing rules, is deciding on the "materiality" 
of the possible conflict; disclosure or withdrawal is otherwise unnec­
essary and unwarranted. Nonetheless, regardless of whether the 
rules would label a conflict as material, the lawyer at least should 
discuss any potentially raced aspects of the representation, includ­
ing the lawyer's own perspective on the common good versus indi­
vidual goals. Pursuing race consciousness makes explicit one form 
of power that the lawyer enjoys. It also expands the options of legal 
arguments that are available to the client and makes the client bet� 
ter informed about her lawyer's decisionmaking. 
2. Representation Process 
It is a truism that race and other identity characteristics affect 
the lawyer-client relationship, although it is less clear how they do 
so. Differences between the lawyer and the client may have an im­
pact on the rapport between lawyer and client,172 or even on the 
abilities of the lawyer and client to understand each other.173 The 
language used by lawyers and clients may differ because of race or 
class.174 They may also affect the client's attitude toward her case 
simply because she feels more comfortable with a lawyer of the 
same race. Race consciousness is thus important for both the law­
yer and the client, regardless of the substantive nature of the 
representation. 
3. Litigation 
In crafting complaints and other court documents, in developing 
a case strategy, what role should race play?175 Race certainly plays 
a role in how people are perceived in the courtroom.176 Legal ac-
172. See Hing, supra note 16, at 1809. 
173. See Cunningham, supra note 14; Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic 
Narratives: The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race & Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. -
(1997). 
174. See, e.g., JoHN M. CONLEY & WILUAM R. O'BARR, RuLEs VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: 
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); Brian E. Albrecht, You Are How You 
Speak; Dialect Experts Discuss Complexity Within Language, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleve­
land), July 1, 1996, at lB. 
175. For a compelling article on how better to draft complaints in civil rights cases, see 
Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 
YALE LJ. 763 (1995): For discussion of case strategy, see Miller, supra note 14. 
176. See Michelle Jacobs, Legitimacy and the Power Game, 1 CLINICAL L. Rav. 187 
(1994) (recounting incidents of racism against her in the courthouse, and her students' reac­
tions). The 12 race bias studies similarly show the significance of race. See supra note 12. 
Sex also plays a role. Karen Czapanskiy notes that women litigants represented by female 
lawyers can be disadvantaged because of bias against the lawyers. See Karen Czapanskiy, 
Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender 
Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1993). 
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tors will perceive a white lawyer with a white client differently than 
a black lawyer with a black client. 
Beyond that, however, lawyers must struggle with whether, 
when, and how to mention race. As discussed above, challenges to 
the cooperation requirement need not mention race, and, indeed, 
most court decisions do not. When race is not explicitly an issue, as 
in the child support cooperation cases, the question is whether and 
how to make it an issue. The plaintiff's race could easily make its 
first appearance in the initial complaint. While the defendant will 
probably know the plaintiff 's race, a judge may not see the plaintiff 
until the trial, so the judge will not be conscious of any race 
issues.111 
Regardless of how race figures in the complaint, a lawyer must 
decide how to use race at trial. Race could become an issue, for 
example, by calling witnesses who will testify to customs in poor 
black communities, or by showing the disparate impact of race on 
poor black women.178 Given the many different ways that attor­
neys can define and construct the relevant stories, these racialized 
choices become critical to the client's case.119 
Most others who have considered the importance of race in de­
veloping the client's case have focused on criminal encounters, such 
as African-American men stopped by white police, or whites who 
commit crimes against blacks. Race is already visible in the differ­
ences between the victim and defendant.18° It is outside of these 
177. By this I mean that the judge may not question any assumptions that she, makes 
about the plaintiff's race. Omitting race results in a "seemingly neutral" story. See Richard 
Delgado, Storytel/jng for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, f!Jl MrcH. L. REV. 
2411, 2422 (1989). 
178. See Roberts, supra note 165. 
179. See Cunningham, supra note 14 (discussing how the use of race as a lens through 
which to develop case theory completely changes the case theory); Miller, supra note H, at 
545. Binny Miller later explains: 
At one level, the fact that [the client] is black and the security guards are white makes 
the encounter a racial incident. We do not need case theory to see this encounter as 
having something to do with race, given the power of racial images in our society. But 
once we highlight the role of race as a critical factor, then the story comes into sharper 
focus. 
Id. at 542. 
180. In addition to those sources already cited, see Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: 
Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 
781 (1994); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE LJ. 677 (1995). Gary Peller begins an article on racism and criminal jus­
tice by observing that "[c]riminal law is an obvious topic for a critical' analysis of racial 
power." Garry Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Criti­
cal Tools of the Sixties, 67 Tur... L. REv. 2231, 2231 (1993). Sheri Johnson suggests a general 
prohibition against the use of racial imagery in the courtroom, albeit with exceptions such as 
for race-based motives, or where racial imagery is "necessary to the accurate determination 
of the truth of the charges against the defendant(s)." Johnson, supra note 20, at 1799-802. 
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contexts that the issue of representing race becomes much more 
problematic. 
Race may be relevant on many different levels, ranging from 
explanations for an individual's actions to challenges to white-based 
rules. For example, race could play several roles in constructing a 
case theory to challenge the child support cooperation requirement. 
First, a lawyer might point to racially biased decisionmaking by an 
individual caseworker who deemed the client noncooperative. 
While such decisionmaking may be difficult to document, a review 
of who has been deemed noncooperative may reveal race discrimi­
nation.181 Second, a lawyer might introduce sociological evidence 
as to the employability of, and job availability for, poor black men 
as a method of explaining why the mother cannot, or will not, pro­
vide the requisite information about the father.182 Third, the lawyer 
might challenge, more generally, the cooperation requirement itself 
by showing its assumptions about welfare recipients. And fourth, 
the lawyer could challenge the entire welfare system as operating 
on a racist basis.183 
While there is no existing obligation in the professional respon­
sibility rules that the lawyer consider case strategies on any of these 
levels, we might choose to add a requirement that the lawyer think 
through the race implications both of her actions in representing 
the client, and of the client's case itself.184 Such a requirement 
would neither ban nor encourage racial narratives, although it 
should foster more of them as attorneys realize the relevance of 
race to any particular case. While difficult to enforce, such a re­
quirement would serve as a reminder and, ideally, as an inspiration. 
While I agree with her on the damaging effects of negative racial stereotypes, she focuses on 
criminal cases; she does not explore how racial images may benefit a plaintiff in a civil case. 
181. This is what Martin Garbus found with respect to man-in-the-house rules in King v. 
Smith. See supra note 36. 
182. This appears to have been the theory in Doston. See supra text accompanying note 
104. 
183. Bringing an equal protection claim based on race may lead courts to examine more 
closely all of the other possible grounds for decision because of the "last resort rule," pursu­
ant to which courts will decline to decide a case based on a constitutional ground if a noncon­
stitutional basis is available. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Ashwander v. Tennessee 
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, 
Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994). 
184. As David Wiikins notes, disciplinary rules in this area are highly problematic and 
inevitably vague. See Wilkins, supra note 151, at 1069 n.183. Nonetheless, this accusation 
could be leveled at any number of existing rules of legal ethics; it is through adopting and 
living with these rules that they can acquire content. 
In a slightly different context, Professor Johnson has developed comprehensive and rela­
tively detailed rules to prevent the use of racially derogatory stereotypes. See Johnson, supra 
note 20. 
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It would carry a corresponding obligation that the lawyer counsel 
her client as to the existence, as well as the potential benefits and 
drawbacks, of such stories.18s 
As an alternative to such a yague standard, or as a supplement 
to it, we could change legal education so that race considerations 
are made more explicit throughout the curriculum.186 Lest I be ac­
cused of requiring political correctness in the classroom, I would 
not mandate race-conscious legal education. But, in a manner simi­
lar to what has happened with respect to sex-gender consciousness 
in legal education,187 individual professors, with institutional sup­
port, can attempt to incorporate an awareness of the race concerns 
of any particular case into any course so that race issues appear 
outside of classes explicitly concerned with race and racism in 
American law.188 
C. Objections to Race Relevance 
There are many objections to race consciousness in representa­
tion. The first addresses whether it is necessary to think through 
race in cases to which it seems utterly irrelevant. The simple an­
swer is no - I am not arguing that all attorneys in all cases become 
race conscious. Yet only by considering the race implications of a 
particular case will a lawyer be able to assess the relevance of race. 
Litigation over the disposition of a testator's property, the custody 
of children, or the infringement of a patent does not appear to im­
plicate race or racial images. But if, for example, they involve par..; 
ties of different races, race may be an issue. And because they all 
involve application of rules developed in a legal system that, until 
185. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the 
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549, 1607, 1609 (1995) (sug­
gesting that the lawyer has a "presumptive moral obligation" to engage in counseling when 
the client may take illegal or other destructive actions). 
186. Such concerns are raised in specialized courses. See, e.g., Hing, supra note 16; see 
also Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from Legal Education, 28 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 51 
(1994) (discussing race in legal education). Professor Kimberle Crenshaw argues that teach­
ers of the objectivity and neutrality of legal discourse actually reinforce a specific set of white 
middle-class values. See Kirnberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious 
Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NATL. BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (1989). David Wilkins recommends 
that students "be encouraged to ask whether racial identity does or should play a role in our 
evaluation of legal texts or our understanding of legal problems." Wiikins, supra note 152, at 
2020. 
187. For a perspective on this issue, see Colloquy, Women in Legal Education -
Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1 (1988). A recently published 
contracts casebook attempts to incorporate race and gender into a standard first-year course. 
See AMY HILSMAN KAsrELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW (1996). 
188. For further discussion of pedagogy, see BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS 
(1994). 
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relatively recently, failed to recognize the formal civil and political 
equality of whites and blacks, the standards themselves may be 
raced.189 It is the suggestion of the significance of considering race 
that is important as a means of ensuring that the issues are raised. 
A second, more serious objection is that a. race-conscious ap­
proach may actually lead to stereotyping and racism. Using race to 
frame a litigant's claims can evoke, and invoke, damaging myths.19o 
This contention is much more difficult to address because it impli­
cates our attitudes and approaches toward race. Our aspirations to 
colorblindness are an effort to ensure that race will not matter, that 
we will treat people as individuals, rather than as raced caricatures. 
Making race count could easily return us to stereotyping. It may 
also lead to thinking about only nonwhites as raced, rather than 
acknowledging the omnipresence of race. 
Given, however, that the stereotypes are already present, race 
may be useful as a means for presenting countermyths and narra­
tives; or, when the stereotypes help the individual plaintiff win her 
case, then the attorney and client may decide together to exploit 
those myths.191 For example, one way of subverting the racialized 
image of welfare recipients is to emphasize when they are white. 
189. See Flagg, supra note 14; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Pro­
tection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). My colleague 
Paul Butler distinguishes between a "liberal critique," which attributes race discrimination to 
individual actors, and a "radical critique," which suggests that the law "is an instrument of 
white supremacy." Butler, supra note 180, at 692-95 (explaining this distinction within the 
criminal law). 
190. This is a claim made by Professors Brown, Williams, and Baumann. See Brown et 
al., supra note 23, at 531, 537-38. Professor Tony Alfieri notes that critical race theorists 
could "complain that race-consciousness encourages an essentialist construction of racial 
identity and narratives in legal storytelling." Alfieri, supra note 20, at 1340. His response is 
to advocate "contingent and . . .  unstable notion[s]" as the basis for storytelling. Id. 
191. Thinking about the relevance of race could, as Professor Margaret Russell suggests, 
result in another problem: "rampant and misguided uses of so-called 'racial' or 'cultural' 
defenses and arguments." Russell, supra note 113, at 1449. For discussion of this potential 
problem, see, e.g., Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, 
and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL L. REv. 1053 (1994); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: 
Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense, " 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994); see also Naomi 
Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 
4 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 339, 357-59 (1995) (discussing the dilemmas involved in recognizing 
culturally specific claims); Abbe Smith, On Representing a Victim of Crime, in LAW STORIES 
149, 162-63 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996) (exploring whether a lesbian public 
defender would raise arguments that the defendant was provoked because of his victim's 
lesbian sexual relationship). There are, however, existing mechanisms for handling such un­
substantiated defenses that should prevent them from being raised. When such mechanisms 
do not exist, then, as a culture, we must decide whether to allow such claims to proceed. 
Indeed, the more that they are raised, the more opportunities available for establishing their 
irrelevance and inapplicability. While this does not mean that only "colorblind" claims 
should be permitted, it does mean that only nonfrivolous race-based claims should be 
brought. 
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I hope· that the effort to think through and interrogate race 
would prevent stereotyping and instead lead to a healthy apprecia­
tion of the difference that race makes, and the detrimental effects of 
a failure to understand the impact of allegedly race-neutral deci­
sionmaking.192 I do not believe that race must be mentioned in 
every case, nor even that it is relevant to every legal dispute; it may 
help, for example, to use "neutral" language to describe the parties 
in an attempt to avoid stereotyping. My argument is that lawyers 
need to think about race, to become conscious of the issues of race 
within their advocacy, rather than refer to, or avoid referring to, 
race constantly in their litigation.193 Many types of advocacy have 
the potential to implicate race on some level, whether it be an indi­
vidual's racist actions or laws developed in a legal system that has 
excluded blacks; the critical dilemma is deciding if and how to han­
dle these issues. It becomes important to acknowledge that our 
model of lawyering was not developed in a colorblind world, and 
that it is not, and should not be, colorblind. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding liberal integrationist goals, we remain a race­
conscious society. When thinking through a case strategy, when de­
veloping techniques for the courtroom, advocates need to consider 
the implications of race. Using race consciousness in client advo­
cacy requires asking "the race question" in representation and dis­
cussing raced issues with the client. It means questioning the 
alleged neutrality of the rules governing representation to see how 
they assume white lawyers and clients. 
Consciousness of race in lawyering will certainly improve the 
representation process with respect to the lawyer-client relation­
ship. Although it may be less clear how to use race in litigation, 
Professor Jody Armour draws a useful distinction between "rationality-enhancing and 
rationality-subverting group references" to African Americans and other stereotyped groups. 
Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice 
Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv. 733, 768 {1995). The former challenge jurors to confront their nega­
tive stereotypes, while the latter exploit those stereotypes. See id. He recommends that 
courts permit only the use of the rationality-enhancing references. While I am unsure 
whether an absolute bar against such "subverting" references is beneficial, cf. Barnes, supra 
note 19, I agree on the utility of using race to confront stereotypes. And I would expand his 
proposal to include stereotypes about whites as well. 
192. See Armour, supra note 180; Flagg, supra note 14, at 977, 982 (discussing the impor­
tance of skepticism about racial neutrality). 
193. Professor David Wilkins speaks of somewhat similar obligations for black lawyers. 
See Wilkins, supra note 152, at 2015. And Professor Alfieri discusses the importance of con­
sidering the impact of racialized narratives. See Alfieri, supra note 20, at 1338-39. I believe 
that lawyers must consider the impact of race on their lawyering. 
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outside of cases that explicitly involve interracial issues, the rele­
vance of race should be considered in other aspects of the lawyering 
process. Race consciousness may lead to additional case theories 
and litigation strategies, as well as an improved understanding of 
the client's situation. While race will not be relevant to many cases, 
it certainly is an issue beyond cases involving parties of different 
races, and beyond cases involving black clients and black attorneys. 
